A surprising connection on the professional network. A proposal of work from a recruiter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China containing “non-public” or “insider” insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this method would be suspicious. However, China’s powerful intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, seeking political, industrial, military and scientific secrets. But a new initiative aimed at elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
An espionage alert was issued on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press assists the wider public better identify interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from in and around Westminster, although that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants people in public life to understand that simply because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been responding to any specific incident in parliament, although the recent actions does come after the embarrassing collapse of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
The two had been charged of spying for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but failure to complete a trial under the now repealed previous legislation led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Strategic Interests
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in behavior that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. But Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize information gathering techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in someone quickly peripheral turning significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a level under the level of direct conflict. The nation has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the another operation breach of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent attempts to find covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to display influence and because it has the capability.
